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A Note on Craig on Miller/Cherry 
 
Paul Craig’s long article in defence of the much shorter judgment by a unanimous, eleven-member 
Supreme Court is presumably motivated by the importance of the Miller/Cherry ruling and the 
desire to rebut any criticism of it. His argument is mostly directed towards criticisms made by two 
of his Oxford colleagues. Had it remained an in-house argument I would have had no cause to 
respond. But he states that its focus is on ‘three longer critiques’ (p.2), apparently including a paper 
by me, though I am relegated to the fringes of his analysis with such formulations as ‘Martin 
Loughlin voices an analogous critique’ (p.38) or ‘Martin Loughlin’s critique is similar’ (p.46).  
Professor Craig claims that in addressing these three critiques ‘no element of the critique … is 
omitted’ and that his method ‘brings the elements of the criticism into better focus’ (pp.7-8). With 
regard to my arguments, however, this is simply not the case. I refer to six of them which his 
analysis overlooks.1 
The first concerns the effect of Article IX of the Bill of Rights on the reviewability of the 
prorogation. Putting aside the continuing debate over whether prorogation is a ‘proceeding in 
Parliament’, we might recall that the Court ruled that it was as if the Royal Commissioners ‘had 
walked into Parliament with a blank piece of paper’ ([2019] UKSC 41 [69]). But the piece of paper 
the Commissioners presented did not just prorogue Parliament; it also granted Royal Assent to the 
Parliamentary Buildings (Restoration and Renewal) Bill. This unavoidably complicates the issue. 
Although the Supreme Court had previously held that Royal Assent is a proceeding in Parliament,2  
the Court’s ruling in Miller/Cherry in effect nullified that Royal Assent. It led to an Act of Parliament 
being removed from the Parliament Roll and required the Speaker to rule that Royal Assent for 
the Bill needed to be re-signified. I argue that the Court misunderstood the significance of the 
proceeding on which it had ruled, that its decision was contrary to established law, and that it was 
decided per incuriam. 
The second issue relates to justiciability, not the principle on which there is still disagreement 
but on the Court’s reasoning process. The Court held that (i) ‘every prerogative power has its 
limits, and it is the function of the court to determine … where they lie’; (ii) since the prerogative 
power ‘is recognised by the common law … [it] has to be compatible with common law principles’; 
and (iii) ‘the boundaries of a prerogative power relating to the operation of Parliament are likely to 
be illuminated, and indeed determined, by the fundamental principles of our constitutional law’ 
	
1 See Martin Loughlin, ‘The Case of Prorogation: The UK Constitutional Council’s ruling on appeal from the 
judgment of the Supreme Court’ Policy Exchange, October 2019: https://policyexchange.org.uk/publication/the-
case-of-prorogation/ 
2 R(Barclay) v Secretary of State for Justice [2014] UKSC 54. 
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[38]. The first statement is uncontentious, but the second is a non-sequitur. One cannot infer from 
the fact that prerogative power is recognised by common law that it must be exercised in accordance 
with (so-called) common law principles. The Court should surely have explained how it managed 
to draw this conclusion from those premises. The difficulties are further compounded with the 
third statement, in which the Court elides ‘common law principles’ and ‘fundamental principles of 
constitutional law’. Through what appears to be faulty reasoning, the Court in effect lends its 
imprimatur to the controversial thesis that ours is a ‘common law constitution’. 
  In addition to this lack of cogency, the Court’s judgment raises questions about the 
consistency of its reasoning. Fidelity to law, not least to the common law, requires respect for 
previous rulings. My analysis referred to discrepancies in the positions adopted by the judges of 
the Supreme Court but here I mention only one. In R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the 
European Union [2017] UKSC 5, Lord Reed was one of the minority who maintained that Article 
50 TEU could be triggered by an exercise of prerogative power. He stated [240]: ‘For a court to 
proceed on the basis that if a prerogative power is capable of being exercised arbitrarily or 
perversely, it must necessarily be subject to judicial control, is to base legal doctrine on an 
assumption which is foreign to our constitutional traditions’. This is a clear statement of the 
orthodox position. Yet it is not at all reconcilable with the views expressed in the Court’s reasoning 
mentioned above. Since Lord Reed was one of the two signatories to the Miller/Cherry ruling, it is 
not unreasonable to expect some explanation of how and why ‘our constitutional traditions’ have 
now been given such an innovative re-interpretation.   
 Craig’s didactic style suggests that the Court is simply discovering the constitution’s true 
meaning. So my fourth point concerns the status of precedents. Craig shows little appreciation of 
past practice with respect to prorogation.3 For instance, in 1948 the Labour Government 
encountered stiff opposition when seeking to limit the Lords’ power under the Parliament Act 
1911 to delay legislation by reducing it from three successive sessions to two. To achieve its 
objective, the Government was obliged, for the first time, to use the 1911 Act procedures. 
Recognising that delay over three sessions might jeopardise having the reform enacted, it exploited 
	
3 Craig argues that the claim that Article IX of the Bill of Rights could be construed as ‘protect[ing] the executive 
from external scrutiny whenever it prorogues Parliament’ would have been rejected at the time of its enactment; it 
would have meant that the ‘very idea of parliamentary sovereignty as it emerged from the Glorious Revolution is 
thereby radically curtailed at the outset’(pp.48-9). This argument is anachronistic. Not only was there then no agency 
of ‘external scrutiny’ of the Crown’s action but this type of argument takes no account of the use of prorogation of 
the period. Consider only the dates of the six sessions of the 1690-95 Parliament: 20 Mar. 1690-23 May 1690 (sits 2 
months; adjourned/prorogued 4 months); 2 Oct. 1690-5 Jan. 1691 (sits 4 months, adjourned/prorogued 9 months); 
2 Oct. 1691-24 Feb. 1692 (sits 5 months, adjourned/prorogued 8 months); 4 Nov. 1692-14 Mar. 1693 (sits 5 
months, prorogued 9 months); 7 Nov. 1693-25 Apr. 1694 (sits 6 months, prorogued 6 months); 12 Nov. 1694-3 




the fact that parliamentary sessions have no fixed duration by arranging for a session of minimal 
length. Consequently, on 13 September 1948 Parliament was prorogued to the following day and 
on 25 October, once the Commons had passed the Parliament Bill, it was again prorogued. This 
six-week session was most surely a prorogation for political purposes. It frustrated the principle of 
Parliamentary accountability and the Supreme Court’s now extended principle of Parliamentary 
sovereignty. On a strict interpretation, this prorogation must also have been unconstitutional but 
with implications that remain unaddressed. 
 With respect to its general constitutional significance, the Supreme Court in Miller/Cherry 
converts political practices into constitutional principles, investing them with normative (and 
legal?) authority so as to assert the power to determine their meaning. The Court is making a pitch 
to become the primary guardian of the British constitution. My fifth point, then, asks whether the 
Court is competent to assume this role. Consider its description of Britain’s constitutional 
foundations:  
 
We live in a representative democracy. The House of Commons exists because the people 
have elected its members. The Government is not directly elected by the people (unlike the 
position in some other democracies). The Government exists because it has the confidence of 
the House of Commons. It has no democratic legitimacy other than that. This means that it is 
accountable to the House of Commons - and indeed to the House of Lords - for its actions, 
remembering always that the actual task of governing is for the executive and not for 
Parliament or the courts.[55]  
 
By any reckoning this is a less than astute account. Any student ‘who looks at the living reality will 
[continue to] wonder at the contrast to the paper description’.4 The justices have offered us a 
twenty-first version of Bagehot’s dignified version of the British constitution. It masks ‘the nearly 
complete fusion of executive and legislative powers’5 and  ignores the fact that ‘modern democracy 
is unthinkable save in terms of [political] parties’.6 This account obscures any direct source of 
governmental authority, trips over itself by implying that ‘democratic legitimacy’ justifies 
governmental accountability to the Lords and peddles the standard nostrum about the separation 
of powers just a few days after Parliament had directed the PM to send the President of the 
European Council a letter whose precise terms they had dictated. None of this inspires much 
confidence that the judiciary is competent to assume the extended role they now claim. 
 Moving on from constitutional narratives to constitutional facts, after the proposed 
prorogation was announced on 28 August, Parliament, duly placed on notice, returned from its 
	
4 Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution (1867) Miles Taylor ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 5. 
5 Bagehot, ibid. 11. 
6 EE Schattschneider, Party Government (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1942), 1. 
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summer adjournment on 3 September. The Commons immediately took control of the order paper 
from the Government. On 4 September, it introduced a Bill to prevent a no deal exit from the EU 
and mandated the Government to request an exit day extension from the European Council. 
Despite Government opposition, this Bill passed all its stages in one day and, on 9 September, 
received Royal Assent as the European Union (Withdrawal) (No 2) Act 2019. During that same 
period, a Government motion to hold a general election twice failed. As the Divisional Court 
stated, these events both clearly demonstrated the ‘ability of Parliament to move with speed when 
it chooses to do so’ and also ‘undermined the underlying premise of the cases … namely that the 
prorogation would deny Parliament the opportunity to do precisely what it has just done’: [2019] 
EWHC 2381[57]. In the light of actions taken by the Commons between 3 and 10 September, it 
is unclear how, later that same month, the Supreme Court could hold that the prorogation had an 
‘extreme effect upon the fundamentals of our democracy’[58]. 
 Each of these arguments is presented in my paper on Miller/Cherry. All raise serious 
questions about the cogency of the Supreme Court’s judgment. None are addressed by Professor 
Craig in his critique of the critiques. These omissions suggest that his lengthy defence of the 
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